Book talk:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4

Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.

Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways to avoid ascribing immorality to people in comas: have no such moral rules for anyone...or just say, like any sane moral philosopher, that moral agents necessarily have to be able to comprehend moral rules.

Obviously there's no need to avoid moral rules that might make moral nonagents immoral...since they can't be immoral.

Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll create from scratch a burning rhetorical building that you have to exit, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it. The preferred one will eliminate the absurdity that led him to think that the burning rhetorical building existed at all.

-- Mr. C