Contractual community: Difference between revisions
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There are two major differences between contractual communities and the typical community political government. First, the governing body of a contractual community (usually called a residential community association) does not have the power to levy taxes like its political counterpart. Secondly, in a contractual community the relationship between the party that owns the property and the people who live there is based upon an explicit contract entered into by both parties. Such a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, nor by the majority of residents. In political communities, the relationship is non-contractual (what the government would call "constitutional") in nature, and can be changed by the government or a majority of the voters. The institutions of political governance reserve to themselves the right of final constitutional interpretation and enforcement.<ref name="Watner_Beyond">Carl Watner. [http://www.voluntaryist.com/articles/080.html "Beyond the Wit of Man to Foresee": Voluntaryism and Land Use Controls], ''voluntaryist.com'', Number 80 - June 1996. Referenced 2012-12-02.</ref> | There are two major differences between contractual communities and the typical community political government. First, the governing body of a contractual community (usually called a residential community association) does not have the power to levy taxes like its political counterpart. Secondly, in a contractual community the relationship between the party that owns the property and the people who live there is based upon an explicit contract entered into by both parties. Such a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, nor by the majority of residents. In political communities, the relationship is non-contractual (what the government would call "constitutional") in nature, and can be changed by the government or a majority of the voters. The institutions of political governance reserve to themselves the right of final constitutional interpretation and enforcement.<ref name="Watner_Beyond">Carl Watner. [http://www.voluntaryist.com/articles/080.html "Beyond the Wit of Man to Foresee": Voluntaryism and Land Use Controls], ''voluntaryist.com'', Number 80 - June 1996. Referenced 2012-12-02.</ref> | ||
{{See also|Zoning}} | |||
==Contractual communities in the US== | ==Contractual communities in the US== | ||
Revision as of 14:51, 4 December 2012
A contractual community is a community regulated by private contract.[citation needed]
There are two major differences between contractual communities and the typical community political government. First, the governing body of a contractual community (usually called a residential community association) does not have the power to levy taxes like its political counterpart. Secondly, in a contractual community the relationship between the party that owns the property and the people who live there is based upon an explicit contract entered into by both parties. Such a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, nor by the majority of residents. In political communities, the relationship is non-contractual (what the government would call "constitutional") in nature, and can be changed by the government or a majority of the voters. The institutions of political governance reserve to themselves the right of final constitutional interpretation and enforcement.[1]
Contractual communities in the US
One of the earliest uses of private covenants was found in St. Louis, Missouri, where during the 1850s and 1860s, nearly one hundred subdivisions or private places were formed within the city. "A private place could encompass one or more streets and was governed by an elected lot association. Not only did each private place own and maintain its streets, but in many cases it also owned the sewers, water mains, and utility easements."
The private places of St. Louis, and other early subdivisions like Tuxedo Park, New York (1885), Riverside, Illinois (1869), Country Club District (Kansas City, 1906), and River Oaks (Houston, 1925) were the forerunners of today's "new towns." They paralleled the construction of new company towns, such as Gary, Indiana (U.S. Steel, 1906), Kohler, Wisconsin (The Kohler Company, 1916), and Chicopee, Georgia (Chicopee Manufacturing Company, 1924). In time, they have been followed by such mammoth places as Irvine Ranch (93,000 acres in Orange County, California developed by The Irvine Company), California City (90,000 acres in Riverside County, California developed by Kaiser-Aetna), and Valencia (44,000 acres near Los Angeles, California built by Newhall Land and Farming Company). The essential element that links all of these projects is their reliance upon private enterprise. The entrepreneurs who built these places all realized that contractual communities were the key to creating and maintaining value, both for investors and those who chose to live in their new towns.
In Columbia, Maryland, the planned development of The Rouse Company of Baltimore, Maryland, had as of April 1995 nine major villages and a Town Center, where 81,000 people lived. Rouse did not resort to federal loan guarantees provided by Congress in 1966 to private developers of new towns.
Another example of a contractual community is Walt Disney World, an entertainment and resort complex that lies southeast of Orlando, Florida. Disney World consists of 28,000 acres, which encompasses a wildlife preserve of 8200 acres. "To avoid holdouts as well as to keep the land prices in the area from escalating, Walt Disney had by 1964 acquired the land in small parcels using various holding companies. Using middlemen, stealth, and more than 100 dummy corporations, [Disney] went on a secret land-buying spree near Orlando, paying about $400 an acre." One important aspect of the development is that Disney purchased much more land than was needed for, or intended for, Disney World. He wanted "to create a buffer zone" around the theme park "and avoid the motels, fast-food stores and unsightly neon cacophony that developed around Disneyland in California." By being able to control the surrounding environment, Disney management would not only be able to guide future development, but also assure itself of a profit as land around Disney World increased in value. Like Rouse, Disney aimed to show "that through free enterprise you could take virgin land and develop it without any government subsidy."[1]
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Carl Watner. "Beyond the Wit of Man to Foresee": Voluntaryism and Land Use Controls, voluntaryist.com, Number 80 - June 1996. Referenced 2012-12-02.
Links
- "Proprietary Communities and Community Associations" by Fred Foldvary, 1994, Chapters 3, 8, 10 (pdf), references
- Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services by Roy Cordato
- From Privies to Boulevards: The Private Supply of Infrastructure in the United States during the Nineteenth Century (pdf) by David T. Beito, 1993
- Private place and Planned community on Wikipedia