A priori proposition: Difference between revisions
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'''A priori propositions''' have traditionally been defined as those which can be known independent of experience. A priori propositions can be contrasted to a posteriori propositions; the later being those which are gained through experience. An alternative definition of a priori propositions, which is popular among many contemporary philosophers, makes the distinction that rather than being completely independent or prior to experience, an a priori proposition is one whose truth can be grasped "without any justification from the character of the subject's experience".<ref>Boghossian P., and Peacocke C. "New Essays on the A Priori", 2000, page 1.</ref> The reason for the alternative definition can be explained in the following manner: | '''A priori propositions''' have traditionally been defined as those which can be known independent of experience. A priori propositions can be contrasted to a posteriori propositions; the later being those which are gained through experience. An alternative definition of a priori propositions, which is popular among many contemporary philosophers, makes the distinction that rather than being completely independent or prior to experience, an a priori proposition is one whose truth can be grasped "without any justification from the character of the subject's experience".<ref>Boghossian P., and Peacocke C. "New Essays on the A Priori", 2000, page 1.</ref> The reason for the alternative definition can be explained in the following manner: | ||
{{Quote| | {{Quote|Experience may be a precondition of coming to know a prior truths, but those truths nevertheless have a justification, and can also be justified for the thinker, independently of experience.|P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke|''[[New Essays on the A Priori]]''}} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Latest revision as of 21:02, 23 October 2011
A priori propositions have traditionally been defined as those which can be known independent of experience. A priori propositions can be contrasted to a posteriori propositions; the later being those which are gained through experience. An alternative definition of a priori propositions, which is popular among many contemporary philosophers, makes the distinction that rather than being completely independent or prior to experience, an a priori proposition is one whose truth can be grasped "without any justification from the character of the subject's experience".[1] The reason for the alternative definition can be explained in the following manner:
Experience may be a precondition of coming to know a prior truths, but those truths nevertheless have a justification, and can also be justified for the thinker, independently of experience.
References
- ↑ Boghossian P., and Peacocke C. "New Essays on the A Priori", 2000, page 1.