A priori proposition: Difference between revisions
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'''A priori propositions''' have traditionally been defined as those which can be known independent of experience. A priori propositions can be contrasted to a posteriori propositions; the later being those which are gained through experience. An alternative definition of a priori propositions, which is popular among many contemporary philosophers, makes the distinction that rather than being completely independent or prior to experience, an a priori proposition is one which can be grasped independently of the character of an individual's experience.<ref>Boghossian P., and Peacocke C. "New Essays on the A Priori", | '''A priori propositions''' have traditionally been defined as those which can be known independent of experience. A priori propositions can be contrasted to a posteriori propositions; the later being those which are gained through experience. An alternative definition of a priori propositions, which is popular among many contemporary philosophers, makes the distinction that rather than being completely independent or prior to experience, an a priori proposition is one which can be grasped independently of the character of an individual's experience.<ref>Boghossian P., and Peacocke C. "New Essays on the A Priori", 2000, page 1.</ref> The reason for the alternative definition can be explained in the following manner: | ||
{{Quote|In the case of a priori propositions, much experience, perhaps of a specific character, may be required to grasp the concepts implicated in the proposition or to access the entitlement to believe it; but conditions of grasp and of access remain distinct from the nature of the entitlement.|P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke|''[[New Essays on the A Priori]]''}} | {{Quote|In the case of a priori propositions, much experience, perhaps of a specific character, may be required to grasp the concepts implicated in the proposition or to access the entitlement to believe it; but conditions of grasp and of access remain distinct from the nature of the entitlement.|P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke|''[[New Essays on the A Priori]]''}} | ||
Revision as of 19:51, 23 October 2011
A priori propositions have traditionally been defined as those which can be known independent of experience. A priori propositions can be contrasted to a posteriori propositions; the later being those which are gained through experience. An alternative definition of a priori propositions, which is popular among many contemporary philosophers, makes the distinction that rather than being completely independent or prior to experience, an a priori proposition is one which can be grasped independently of the character of an individual's experience.[1] The reason for the alternative definition can be explained in the following manner:
In the case of a priori propositions, much experience, perhaps of a specific character, may be required to grasp the concepts implicated in the proposition or to access the entitlement to believe it; but conditions of grasp and of access remain distinct from the nature of the entitlement.
References
- ↑ Boghossian P., and Peacocke C. "New Essays on the A Priori", 2000, page 1.