From The Austrian Economics Wiki, the global repository of classical-liberal thought
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| <blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>
| | I moved the review content to [[Debate:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4]]. [[User:FormerContributor-78162cb3|FormerContributor-78162cb3]] ([[User talk:FormerContributor-78162cb3|talk]]) 01:56, 13 October 2012 (MSD) |
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| Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: ensure no moral rules ascribe immorality to them...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.
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| Since avoiding the second way would also be "hard to imagine", you should automatically accept it. Since the proposed problem will no longer exist, the first way is no longer necessary at all.
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| Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.
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| The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it.
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| -- Mr. C | |
Latest revision as of 07:05, 23 July 2026
