Threat: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
A '''threat''' is the communication to a person of the [[intent]] of [[aggression]] against that person. [[Stephan Kinsella]] has argued that there are limits to how useful [[armchair reasoning]] about hypothetical threats can be.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://archive.mises.org/5391/the-limits-of-armchair-theorizing-the-case-of-threats/|title=The Limits of Armchair Theorizing: The case of Threats|author=Kinsella, Stephan|date=27 July 2006|publisher=Mises Economics Blog}}</ref> | A '''threat''' is the communication to a person of the [[intent]] of [[violence]] (which may or may not be [[aggression]]) against that person. [[Stephan Kinsella]] has argued that there are limits to how useful [[armchair reasoning]] about hypothetical threats can be.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://archive.mises.org/5391/the-limits-of-armchair-theorizing-the-case-of-threats/|title=The Limits of Armchair Theorizing: The case of Threats|author=Kinsella, Stephan|date=27 July 2006|publisher=Mises Economics Blog}}</ref> | ||
== Game Theory == | == Game Theory == | ||
Latest revision as of 08:48, 24 October 2013
A threat is the communication to a person of the intent of violence (which may or may not be aggression) against that person. Stephan Kinsella has argued that there are limits to how useful armchair reasoning about hypothetical threats can be.[1]
Game Theory
In game theory a threat is a response rule that punishes others who fail to cooperate with you. It is a strategic move in the sense that it limits the options of the person making the threat and creates control in a situation, compelling another to cooperate.[2]
References
- ↑ Kinsella, Stephan (27 July 2006). "The Limits of Armchair Theorizing: The case of Threats". Mises Economics Blog. http://archive.mises.org/5391/the-limits-of-armchair-theorizing-the-case-of-threats/.
- ↑ Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically (New York, NY: 1991) 124-125