Utilitarianism: Difference between revisions
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'''Utilitarianism''' is the moral doctrine holding that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse.<ref name="Mill_what_utilitarianism_is">[[John Stuart Mill]]. ''Utilitarianism'', II. What Utilitarianism Is.</ref> In its classical form, given by Jeremy Bentham and [[John Stuart Mill]], pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends, and everything else is desirable as a means to them. | |||
The doctrine matters here because the two dominant defences of the [[free market]] in the Austrian and libertarian traditions divide precisely over whether to accept it. | |||
==Mises's utilitarianism== | |||
[[Ludwig von Mises]] was a utilitarian, and his defence of [[liberalism]] is explicitly consequentialist. He held that [[economics]] as a science is value-free and can establish only that a given means will or will not attain a given end; it cannot pronounce ends good or bad. What it can show is that social cooperation under the [[division of labor]] and private ownership of the means of production achieves the ends nearly everyone actually holds, and that the proposed alternatives defeat them. | |||
Mises therefore did not argue that [[socialism]] is unjust. He argued that it cannot work, because it abolishes the [[economic calculation|calculation]] that the direction of production requires, and that those who advocate it are mistaken about means rather than depraved in their ends.<ref name="humanaction_ch2">[[Ludwig von Mises]]. [https://freecapitalists.org/books/human-action/read/chapter-ii-the-epistemological-problems-of-the-sciences-of/ II. The Epistemological Problems of the Sciences of Human Action], ''[[Human Action]]''.</ref> This gives the argument its distinctive shape: it appeals to no premise about rights and asks the opponent only to want what he already says he wants. | |||
==Rothbard's rejection== | |||
[[Murray N. Rothbard]] regarded this as an insufficient foundation and argued for [[Natural law|natural rights]] instead. His objections were that a utilitarian defence of the market is hostage to the facts, so that a demonstration that some intervention did raise welfare would oblige the utilitarian to accept it; that it requires interpersonal comparisons of [[utility]], which Austrians hold to be impossible since utility is ordinal and not measurable; and that it cannot condemn an injustice suffered by a few for the benefit of many, which is exactly the case where a moral principle is needed.<ref name="ethics">[[Murray N. Rothbard]]. [https://freecapitalists.org/books/the-ethics-of-liberty/ ''The Ethics of Liberty''].</ref> | |||
Rothbard's alternative derives property titles from self-ownership and the appropriation of unowned resources, and judges institutions by whether they respect those titles regardless of the consequences. | |||
==The standing disagreement== | |||
The division persists and is one of the genuine fault lines in the tradition. Utilitarians reply that natural-rights derivations rest on premises no less contestable than the ones they replace, and that a doctrine indifferent to consequences is a poor guide to institutions. Some writers, including [[Henry Hazlitt]] in ''The Foundations of Morality'', have sought a middle position in rule utilitarianism, judging general rules rather than individual acts by their consequences and thereby recovering much of the stability that rights are wanted for. | |||
==See also== | |||
* [[Natural law]] | |||
* [[Utility]] | |||
* [[Ludwig von Mises]] | |||
* [[Murray N. Rothbard]] | |||
* [[Ethics]] | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
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[[Category: | [[Category:Concepts]] | ||
Latest revision as of 05:43, 16 August 2026
Utilitarianism is the moral doctrine holding that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse.[1] In its classical form, given by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends, and everything else is desirable as a means to them.
The doctrine matters here because the two dominant defences of the free market in the Austrian and libertarian traditions divide precisely over whether to accept it.
Mises's utilitarianism
Ludwig von Mises was a utilitarian, and his defence of liberalism is explicitly consequentialist. He held that economics as a science is value-free and can establish only that a given means will or will not attain a given end; it cannot pronounce ends good or bad. What it can show is that social cooperation under the division of labor and private ownership of the means of production achieves the ends nearly everyone actually holds, and that the proposed alternatives defeat them.
Mises therefore did not argue that socialism is unjust. He argued that it cannot work, because it abolishes the calculation that the direction of production requires, and that those who advocate it are mistaken about means rather than depraved in their ends.[2] This gives the argument its distinctive shape: it appeals to no premise about rights and asks the opponent only to want what he already says he wants.
Rothbard's rejection
Murray N. Rothbard regarded this as an insufficient foundation and argued for natural rights instead. His objections were that a utilitarian defence of the market is hostage to the facts, so that a demonstration that some intervention did raise welfare would oblige the utilitarian to accept it; that it requires interpersonal comparisons of utility, which Austrians hold to be impossible since utility is ordinal and not measurable; and that it cannot condemn an injustice suffered by a few for the benefit of many, which is exactly the case where a moral principle is needed.[3]
Rothbard's alternative derives property titles from self-ownership and the appropriation of unowned resources, and judges institutions by whether they respect those titles regardless of the consequences.
The standing disagreement
The division persists and is one of the genuine fault lines in the tradition. Utilitarians reply that natural-rights derivations rest on premises no less contestable than the ones they replace, and that a doctrine indifferent to consequences is a poor guide to institutions. Some writers, including Henry Hazlitt in The Foundations of Morality, have sought a middle position in rule utilitarianism, judging general rules rather than individual acts by their consequences and thereby recovering much of the stability that rights are wanted for.
See also
References
- ↑ John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism, II. What Utilitarianism Is.
- ↑ Ludwig von Mises. II. The Epistemological Problems of the Sciences of Human Action, Human Action.
- ↑ Murray N. Rothbard. The Ethics of Liberty.