Dot-com bubble - Revision history

Pestergaines: Reverted edits by 94.102.57.92 (talk) to last revision by Pestergaines

2013-07-15T15:50:02Z

Reverted edits by 94.102.57.92 (talk) to last revision by Pestergaines

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:50, 15 July 2013
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	Japanese manufacturing firms were faltering in 1995. "By April 1995, the yen had reached an all-time high of 79 to the dollar. . . . With the currency at such a pinnacle, Japanese producers could not even cover their variable costs". Many Japanese banks were facing insolvency. The U.S. had just gone through the [[1994 economic crisis in Mexico\|Mexican bailout]], and authorities were not enthusiastic about having to face a similar bailout scaled up to the size of the Japanese economy. The Reverse Plaza Accord was, in effect, an agreement that the U.S., German , and Japanese governments would subsidize American consumers’ purchases of Japanese and German manufactured goods. The reversal of the exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with respect to those in the U.S., but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by Germany and the U.S. government itself".		Japanese manufacturing firms were faltering in 1995. "By April 1995, the yen had reached an all-time high of 79 to the dollar. . . . With the currency at such a pinnacle, Japanese producers could not even cover their variable costs". Many Japanese banks were facing insolvency. The U.S. had just gone through the [[1994 economic crisis in Mexico\|Mexican bailout]], and authorities were not enthusiastic about having to face a similar bailout scaled up to the size of the Japanese economy. The Reverse Plaza Accord was, in effect, an agreement that the U.S., German, and Japanese governments would subsidize American consumers’ purchases of Japanese and German manufactured goods. The reversal of the exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with respect to those in the U.S., but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by Germany and the U.S. government itself".

	Driving the dollar up against foreign currencies would allow the U.S. government to maintain a stance of monetary ease without raising the CPI, since the artificially lowered price of imported goods would tend to counter the price-raising effect of the increased liquidity.		Driving the dollar up against foreign currencies would allow the U.S. government to maintain a stance of monetary ease without raising the CPI, since the artificially lowered price of imported goods would tend to counter the price-raising effect of the increased liquidity.
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	By 1999, the liquidity party was in full swing. The rate on 30-year [[United States Treasury security\|Treasuries]] had dropped from a high of over 7 percent to a low of 5 percent. The stock markets continued to soar. The NASDAQ Composite rose over 80 percent in 1999 alone. People who had stayed in the sidelines during the early part of the festivities began to feel left out. With abundant credit being freely served to Internet startups, hordes of corporate managers, who had seemed married to their stodgy blue-chip companies, suddenly were romancing some young and sexy dot-com.		By 1999, the liquidity party was in full swing. The rate on 30-year [[United States Treasury security\|Treasuries]] had dropped from a high of over 7 percent to a low of 5 percent. The stock markets continued to soar. The NASDAQ Composite rose over 80 percent in 1999 alone. People who had stayed in the sidelines during the early part of the festivities began to feel left out. With abundant credit being freely served to Internet startups, hordes of corporate managers, who had seemed married to their stodgy blue-chip companies, suddenly were romancing some young and sexy dot-com.

	It is possible to invest more ~~[http://www.ecomcharge.com/ Internet Payment Gateway]~~ and more if enough consumption is forgone to fully fund the investments being planned. However, during the dot-com boom, both investment and consumption exploded in the U.S. economy. Between 1950 and 1992, the personal [[savings]] rate had never gone above 10.9 per cent and never fallen below 7.5 per cent, except in three isolated years. But, between 1992 and 2000, it plummeted from 8.7 per cent to -0.12 per cent. By 2000, households’ outstanding debt as a proportion of personal disposable income reached the all-time high of 97 per cent, up from an average of 80 per cent during the second half of the 1980s. At the same time that consumers were saving less and borrowing more, businesses were increasing their capital spending.		It is possible to invest more and more if enough consumption is forgone to fully fund the investments being planned. However, during the dot-com boom, both investment and consumption exploded in the U.S. economy. Between 1950 and 1992, the personal [[savings]] rate had never gone above 10.9 per cent and never fallen below 7.5 per cent, except in three isolated years. But, between 1992 and 2000, it plummeted from 8.7 per cent to -0.12 per cent. By 2000, households’ outstanding debt as a proportion of personal disposable income reached the all-time high of 97 per cent, up from an average of 80 per cent during the second half of the 1980s. At the same time that consumers were saving less and borrowing more, businesses were increasing their capital spending.

	The height of the bubble could, to some extent, be measured by the surge in number and decline in quality of IPOs, especially during 1999. The value of IPO offerings nearly doubled from 1998 to 1999 alone. Between 1986 and 1990, the San Francisco Bay area saw 90 IPOs, while between 1996 and 2000 there were 390. Before the second half of the 1990s, it was generally considered mandatory for a business to have had at least several profitable quarters before it went public. But by 1999, companies were going public with little more than a sketchy business plan, an Internet address, and a few twenty-somethings who could speak the right lingo. From June 1995 to March 2000, [[Money supply#MZM\|MZM]] grew 52 percent, well ahead of real GDP growth of 22 percent for the same period.		The height of the bubble could, to some extent, be measured by the surge in number and decline in quality of IPOs, especially during 1999. The value of IPO offerings nearly doubled from 1998 to 1999 alone. Between 1986 and 1990, the San Francisco Bay area saw 90 IPOs, while between 1996 and 2000 there were 390. Before the second half of the 1990s, it was generally considered mandatory for a business to have had at least several profitable quarters before it went public. But by 1999, companies were going public with little more than a sketchy business plan, an Internet address, and a few twenty-somethings who could speak the right lingo. From June 1995 to March 2000, [[Money supply#MZM\|MZM]] grew 52 percent, well ahead of real GDP growth of 22 percent for the same period.

94.102.57.92 at 14:15, 15 July 2013

2013-07-15T14:15:59Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:15, 15 July 2013
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	Japanese manufacturing firms were faltering in 1995. "By April 1995, the yen had reached an all-time high of 79 to the dollar. . . . With the currency at such a pinnacle, Japanese producers could not even cover their variable costs". Many Japanese banks were facing insolvency. The U.S. had just gone through the [[1994 economic crisis in Mexico\|Mexican bailout]], and authorities were not enthusiastic about having to face a similar bailout scaled up to the size of the Japanese economy. The Reverse Plaza Accord was, in effect, an agreement that the U.S., German , and Japanese governments would subsidize American consumers’ purchases of Japanese and German manufactured goods~~, [http://www.telsgroup.com/services/oversized_and_heavy_weight_cargoes/ found it here]~~. The reversal of the exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with respect to those in the U.S., but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by Germany and the U.S. government itself".		Japanese manufacturing firms were faltering in 1995. "By April 1995, the yen had reached an all-time high of 79 to the dollar. . . . With the currency at such a pinnacle, Japanese producers could not even cover their variable costs". Many Japanese banks were facing insolvency. The U.S. had just gone through the [[1994 economic crisis in Mexico\|Mexican bailout]], and authorities were not enthusiastic about having to face a similar bailout scaled up to the size of the Japanese economy. The Reverse Plaza Accord was, in effect, an agreement that the U.S., German , and Japanese governments would subsidize American consumers’ purchases of Japanese and German manufactured goods. The reversal of the exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with respect to those in the U.S., but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by Germany and the U.S. government itself".

	Driving the dollar up against foreign currencies would allow the U.S. government to maintain a stance of monetary ease without raising the CPI, since the artificially lowered price of imported goods would tend to counter the price-raising effect of the increased liquidity.		Driving the dollar up against foreign currencies would allow the U.S. government to maintain a stance of monetary ease without raising the CPI, since the artificially lowered price of imported goods would tend to counter the price-raising effect of the increased liquidity.

94.102.57.92 at 14:12, 15 July 2013

2013-07-15T14:12:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:12, 15 July 2013
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	Japanese manufacturing firms were faltering in 1995. "By April 1995, the yen had reached an all-time high of 79 to the dollar. . . . With the currency at such a pinnacle, Japanese producers could not even cover their variable costs". Many Japanese banks were facing insolvency. The U.S. had just gone through the [[1994 economic crisis in Mexico\|Mexican bailout]], and authorities were not enthusiastic about having to face a similar bailout scaled up to the size of the Japanese economy. The Reverse Plaza Accord was, in effect, an agreement that the U.S., German, and Japanese governments would subsidize American consumers’ purchases of Japanese and German manufactured goods. The reversal of the exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with respect to those in the U.S., but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by Germany and the U.S. government itself".		Japanese manufacturing firms were faltering in 1995. "By April 1995, the yen had reached an all-time high of 79 to the dollar. . . . With the currency at such a pinnacle, Japanese producers could not even cover their variable costs". Many Japanese banks were facing insolvency. The U.S. had just gone through the [[1994 economic crisis in Mexico\|Mexican bailout]], and authorities were not enthusiastic about having to face a similar bailout scaled up to the size of the Japanese economy. The Reverse Plaza Accord was, in effect, an agreement that the U.S., German , and Japanese governments would subsidize American consumers’ purchases of Japanese and German manufactured goods, [http://www.telsgroup.com/services/oversized_and_heavy_weight_cargoes/ found it here]. The reversal of the exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with respect to those in the U.S., but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by Germany and the U.S. government itself".

	Driving the dollar up against foreign currencies would allow the U.S. government to maintain a stance of monetary ease without raising the CPI, since the artificially lowered price of imported goods would tend to counter the price-raising effect of the increased liquidity.		Driving the dollar up against foreign currencies would allow the U.S. government to maintain a stance of monetary ease without raising the CPI, since the artificially lowered price of imported goods would tend to counter the price-raising effect of the increased liquidity.
Line 74:		Line 74:
	By 1999, the liquidity party was in full swing. The rate on 30-year [[United States Treasury security\|Treasuries]] had dropped from a high of over 7 percent to a low of 5 percent. The stock markets continued to soar. The NASDAQ Composite rose over 80 percent in 1999 alone. People who had stayed in the sidelines during the early part of the festivities began to feel left out. With abundant credit being freely served to Internet startups, hordes of corporate managers, who had seemed married to their stodgy blue-chip companies, suddenly were romancing some young and sexy dot-com.		By 1999, the liquidity party was in full swing. The rate on 30-year [[United States Treasury security\|Treasuries]] had dropped from a high of over 7 percent to a low of 5 percent. The stock markets continued to soar. The NASDAQ Composite rose over 80 percent in 1999 alone. People who had stayed in the sidelines during the early part of the festivities began to feel left out. With abundant credit being freely served to Internet startups, hordes of corporate managers, who had seemed married to their stodgy blue-chip companies, suddenly were romancing some young and sexy dot-com.

	It is possible to invest more and more if enough consumption is forgone to fully fund the investments being planned. However, during the dot-com boom, both investment and consumption exploded in the U.S. economy. Between 1950 and 1992, the personal [[savings]] rate had never gone above 10.9 per cent and never fallen below 7.5 per cent, except in three isolated years. But, between 1992 and 2000, it plummeted from 8.7 per cent to -0.12 per cent. By 2000, households’ outstanding debt as a proportion of personal disposable income reached the all-time high of 97 per cent, up from an average of 80 per cent during the second half of the 1980s. At the same time that consumers were saving less and borrowing more, businesses were increasing their capital spending.		It is possible to invest more [http://www.ecomcharge.com/ Internet Payment Gateway] and more if enough consumption is forgone to fully fund the investments being planned. However, during the dot-com boom, both investment and consumption exploded in the U.S. economy. Between 1950 and 1992, the personal [[savings]] rate had never gone above 10.9 per cent and never fallen below 7.5 per cent, except in three isolated years. But, between 1992 and 2000, it plummeted from 8.7 per cent to -0.12 per cent. By 2000, households’ outstanding debt as a proportion of personal disposable income reached the all-time high of 97 per cent, up from an average of 80 per cent during the second half of the 1980s. At the same time that consumers were saving less and borrowing more, businesses were increasing their capital spending.

	The height of the bubble could, to some extent, be measured by the surge in number and decline in quality of IPOs, especially during 1999. The value of IPO offerings nearly doubled from 1998 to 1999 alone. Between 1986 and 1990, the San Francisco Bay area saw 90 IPOs, while between 1996 and 2000 there were 390. Before the second half of the 1990s, it was generally considered mandatory for a business to have had at least several profitable quarters before it went public. But by 1999, companies were going public with little more than a sketchy business plan, an Internet address, and a few twenty-somethings who could speak the right lingo. From June 1995 to March 2000, [[Money supply#MZM\|MZM]] grew 52 percent, well ahead of real GDP growth of 22 percent for the same period.		The height of the bubble could, to some extent, be measured by the surge in number and decline in quality of IPOs, especially during 1999. The value of IPO offerings nearly doubled from 1998 to 1999 alone. Between 1986 and 1990, the San Francisco Bay area saw 90 IPOs, while between 1996 and 2000 there were 390. Before the second half of the 1990s, it was generally considered mandatory for a business to have had at least several profitable quarters before it went public. But by 1999, companies were going public with little more than a sketchy business plan, an Internet address, and a few twenty-somethings who could speak the right lingo. From June 1995 to March 2000, [[Money supply#MZM\|MZM]] grew 52 percent, well ahead of real GDP growth of 22 percent for the same period.

Pestergaines: Undo revision 23307 by 178.16.27.65 (talk)

2013-07-11T17:28:16Z

Undo revision 23307 by 178.16.27.65 (talk)

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:28, 11 July 2013
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	* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000
	* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000
	* [www.easyprojects.net/ project management software] by Charly Fox, July 2002.
	* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001		* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001
	* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002		* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002

Pestergaines: Reverted edits by 188.116.36.253 (talk) to last revision by 178.16.27.65

2013-07-11T17:27:47Z

Reverted edits by 188.116.36.253 (talk) to last revision by 178.16.27.65

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:27, 11 July 2013
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	* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000
	* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000
	* [~~http://~~www.easyprojects.net/ project management software] by Charly Fox, July 2002.		* [www.easyprojects.net/ project management software] by Charly Fox, July 2002.
	* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001		* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001
	* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002		* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002

188.116.36.253: /* Links */

2013-07-11T11:35:11Z

Links

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:35, 11 July 2013
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	* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000
	* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000
	* [www.easyprojects.net/ project management software] by Charly Fox, July 2002.		* [http://www.easyprojects.net/ project management software] by Charly Fox, July 2002.
	* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001		* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001
	* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002		* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002

178.16.27.65: /* Links */

2013-07-11T11:32:19Z

Links

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:32, 11 July 2013
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	* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/485 Boom and Bust] by Gene Callahan, August 2000
	* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/572 Fall of the Dot Coms] by William L. Anderson, December 2000
			* [www.easyprojects.net/ project management software] by Charly Fox, July 2002.
	* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001		* [http://mises.org/daily/736 The Dot-Com Future] by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., July 2001
	* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002		* [http://mises.org/daily/906 What Greenspan Didn't Know] by William Stepp, February 2002

Pestergaines: Predictions.

2012-01-08T12:42:57Z

Predictions.

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:42, 8 January 2012
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	The terrorist [[September 11 attacks\|attacks of September 11]], 2001, certainly delivered an unanticipated and unwelcome shock to the economy. However, the economy had already slipped into a recession by late 2000 or early 2001, and while the stock market quickly rebounded from its post-September-11th lows, most major indices sunk back below those lows a year later. By the end of September of 2002, the NASDAQ composite index had hit a 5-year low of 1173, down 77 percent from its peak in 2000. The Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 7,598, off 35 percent from its peak. Unemployment was 2 percent above where it had been at the height of the boom, and GDP growth was an anemic 1.1 percent in the second quarter of 2002.<ref name="Callahan_Dot" />		The terrorist [[September 11 attacks\|attacks of September 11]], 2001, certainly delivered an unanticipated and unwelcome shock to the economy. However, the economy had already slipped into a recession by late 2000 or early 2001, and while the stock market quickly rebounded from its post-September-11th lows, most major indices sunk back below those lows a year later. By the end of September of 2002, the NASDAQ composite index had hit a 5-year low of 1173, down 77 percent from its peak in 2000. The Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 7,598, off 35 percent from its peak. Unemployment was 2 percent above where it had been at the height of the boom, and GDP growth was an anemic 1.1 percent in the second quarter of 2002.<ref name="Callahan_Dot" />

			==Predictions==
			{{Main\|Austrian predictions/Dot-com bubble}}
			The [[Dot-com bubble]] and its bust was foreseen by several Austrian economists.<ref name="Thornton_Bubble">Mark Thornton. [http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_1_1_thornton.pdf "Who Predicted the Bubble? Who Predicted the Crash?"] (pdf), ''The Independent Review'', v. IX, n. 1, Summer 2004, ISSN 1086-1653, Copyright © 2004, pp. 5–30. Referenced 2011-12-13.</ref> In October, 1999, [[Sean Corrigan]] pointed out a massive bubble and implied it will burst. He compared the conditions to those during the late summer of [[Black Monday (1987)\|1987]], the [[Japanese asset price bubble\|Japanese bubble]] of the late 1980s, and the "[[roaring Twenties]]" in the United States. <ref name="Corrigan_Pop">Sean Corrigan. [http://mises.org/daily/317 "Will the Bubble Pop?"], ''Mises Daily'', October 18, 1999. Referenced 2012-01-08.</ref> In March, 2000, [[Christopher Mayer]] noted that all the ingredients of a bubble - fundamental (i.e., a technological revolution), financial (i.e., a surge in money and credit) and psychological (i.e., a suspension of belief in traditional valuation measures) - appear to exist in the current bull market and predicted it will end with a bust.<ref name="Mayer_Over-Valued">Christopher Mayer. [http://mises.org/daily/405 "The Meaning of 'Over-Valued'"], ''Mises Daily'', March 30, 2000. Referenced 2011-12-13.</ref> In August, 2000, [[William Anderson]] pointed to the bubble in the high-technology sector, mentioned the negative consequences of a regulatory attack at Microsoft<ref name="Anderson_Delusion">William L. Anderson. [http://mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=316 "New Economy, Old Delusion"], ''The Free market'', August 2000, Volume 18, Number 8. Referenced 2012-01-08. Quote: "''As things stand currently, the once-vaunted bull market is in flux. This is partly due to the government’s arrogance in believing it could attack Microsoft without harming other high-technology firms that have been the most visible in the current economic expansion.''

			''But even without the DOJ’s Microsoft follies, the high-technology sector of the economy faces real problems. First, the bubble that pushed so many of the "dot.com" initial offerings into the stratosphere had burst even before Reno’s pyrrhic victory. Second, the malinvestments as described by Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard that occur as the result of wildly expansive monetary policies by the Fed have been centered in the high-technology sector. The growth of new money that is the signature of inflation can come only through the fractional-reserve banking system in the form of loans, which, as noted earlier, have found their way into high technologies, real estate, and the stock market.''"</ref> (which was analyzed a year earlier by [[Thomas DiLorenzo]]<ref name="DiLorenzo_Sneak">DiLorenzo, Thomas J. [http://mises.org/daily/297 "Regulatory Sneak Attack."], ''Mises Daily'', September 16, 1999. Referenced 2012-01-08.</ref>). There were others.

	==References==		==References==

Pestergaines: /* The burst of the bubble */ Typo.

2011-12-02T00:03:18Z

The burst of the bubble: Typo.

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:03, 2 December 2011
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	==The burst of the bubble==		==The burst of the bubble==
	In the end, there were too few resources available for all of the plans formulated and funded during the boom to succeed. The most crucial—and most general—unavailable factor was a continuing flow of investment funds. There were shortages of programmers, network engineers, technical managers, office space, housing for workers, and other factors of production. Even industry giants like Microsoft, which did not rely on easy credit for their existence or for the bulk of their growth, were still forced to compete with companies that ~~are~~ relying on easy credit for access to the factors of production.		In the end, there were too few resources available for all of the plans formulated and funded during the boom to succeed. The most crucial—and most general—unavailable factor was a continuing flow of investment funds. There were shortages of programmers, network engineers, technical managers, office space, housing for workers, and other factors of production. Even industry giants like Microsoft, which did not rely on easy credit for their existence or for the bulk of their growth, were still forced to compete with companies that were relying on easy credit for access to the factors of production.

	After the Y2K scare was seen to be much ado about nothing, the Federal Reserve renewed its concern about an over-heating economy and resumed its rate increases. However, even if the Federal Reserve had not tightened, sooner or later the wedge between savings and investment would have manifested itself in an absence of other resources. The rising prices of the factors of production would have brought the boom to an end eventually, whether or not the Federal Reserve tightened credit.		After the Y2K scare was seen to be much ado about nothing, the Federal Reserve renewed its concern about an over-heating economy and resumed its rate increases. However, even if the Federal Reserve had not tightened, sooner or later the wedge between savings and investment would have manifested itself in an absence of other resources. The rising prices of the factors of production would have brought the boom to an end eventually, whether or not the Federal Reserve tightened credit.

Pestergaines: /* Links */ +res

2011-03-23T15:05:46Z

Links: +res

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:05, 23 March 2011
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	==Links==		==Links==
			* [http://mises.org/daily/248 The Crash] by Albert Friedberg, June 1999
	* [http://mises.org/daily/422 Irrational Exuberance?] by Frank Shostak, May 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/422 Irrational Exuberance?] by Frank Shostak, May 2000
	* [http://mises.org/daily/439 Can the Fed Control the Stock Market?] by Frank Shostak, June 2000		* [http://mises.org/daily/439 Can the Fed Control the Stock Market?] by Frank Shostak, June 2000