Book talk:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4 - Revision history

DavidVeksler: Contributor de-identification

2026-07-23T07:05:59Z

Contributor de-identification

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:05, 23 July 2026
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	I moved the review content to [[Debate:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4]]. [[User:~~Nathan Larson~~\|~~Nathan Larson~~]] ([[User talk:~~Nathan Larson~~\|talk]]) 01:56, 13 October 2012 (MSD)		I moved the review content to [[Debate:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4]]. [[User:FormerContributor-78162cb3\|FormerContributor-78162cb3]] ([[User talk:FormerContributor-78162cb3\|talk]]) 01:56, 13 October 2012 (MSD)

FormerContributor-78162cb3 at 18:00, 13 October 2012

2012-10-13T18:00:36Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:00, 13 October 2012
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	I moved the review content to [[~~Review~~:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4]]. [[User:Nathan Larson\|Nathan Larson]] ([[User talk:Nathan Larson\|talk]]) 01:56, 13 October 2012 (MSD)		I moved the review content to [[Debate:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4]]. [[User:Nathan Larson\|Nathan Larson]] ([[User talk:Nathan Larson\|talk]]) 01:56, 13 October 2012 (MSD)

FormerContributor-78162cb3: Replaced content with "I moved the review content to Review:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4. ~~~~"

2012-10-12T21:56:40Z

Replaced content with "I moved the review content to Review:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4. ~~~~"

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:56, 12 October 2012
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	~~== Coma test is invalid ==~~		I moved the review content to [[Review:Book:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4]]. [[User:Nathan Larson\|Nathan Larson]] ([[User talk:Nathan Larson\|talk]]) 01:56, 13 October 2012 (MSD)

	<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the ~~man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>~~

	~~Yeah, that's intuitively "hard~~ to ~~imagine", but there are two ways to avoid ascribing immorality to people in comas~~: ~~have no such moral rules for anyone...or just say, like any sane moral philosopher, that moral agents necessarily have to be able to comprehend moral rules.~~

	~~Obviously there's no need to avoid moral rules that might make moral nonagents immoral...since they can't be immoral.~~

	Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll create from scratch a burning rhetorical building that you have to exit, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

	~~The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it. The preferred one will eliminate the absurdity that led him to think that the burning rhetorical building existed at all.~~

	~~-- Mr. C~~

	~~== Subjective vs objective is badly misunderstood ==~~

	<blockquote>It may seem that these virtues should fall into the realm of aesthetically positive behaviour, such as being on time, but I for one have far too much respect for the traditional virtues to place them in the same category as social niceties. The reason that they cannot be placed into the category of universally preferable is that, as we mentioned above, the framework of UPB only deals with behaviours, not with attitudes, thoughts, states of mind or emotions. The scientific method can process a logical proposition; it cannot process “anger” or “foolhardiness.” These states of mind are not unimportant, of course – in fact, they are essential – but they cannot be part of any objective system for evaluating ethical propositions, since they are essentially subjective – and therefore unprovable – states of being.
	~~Thus UPB can only deal with objectively verifiable actions such as murder, assault and so on.<~~/~~blockquote>~~

	~~This is a very basic and obvious philosophical confusion~~. Zeus as an entity is subjective, since it is a '''fantasy''' that has no objective reality. My mental states, particularly emotions, are entities that occur in objective reality rather than within fantasy. In fact, the technology to read brain states is advancing quite quickly.

	This is not a minor philosophical error, since he says that they are subjective in the sense that requires they be unproveable. Zeus is and will always remain unproveable. Emotions won't be for long. It's not even an irrelevantly technical error, since his reasoning about reality from that was completely false. He shouldn't claim to be a philosopher if his major works include these kinds of basic confusions (~~and no, I didn't use UPB to get that should, since that should has a coherent reason, UPB is thoroughly incoherent, and thus UPB cannot be the reason~~).

	~~Was the reasoning underlying the scope of UPB supposed to be solid (so to speak, since very basic philosophical concepts are confused in it) for only the few remaining years we lack the technology~~, ~~after which we'll have to modify it~~ (~~either to justify retaining the scope or to broaden it~~) ~~because emotions will be verifiable?~~

	~~-- Mr. C~~

108.162.221.60: +Subjective vs objective error

2012-10-12T20:54:54Z

+Subjective vs objective error

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 <blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>
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 The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it. The preferred one will eliminate the absurdity that led him to think that the burning rhetorical building existed at all.
 -- Mr. C

108.162.221.60: ...

2012-10-12T20:13:41Z

...

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:13, 12 October 2012
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	Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways to avoid ascribing immorality to people in comas: have no such moral rules for anyone...or just say, like any sane moral philosopher, that moral agents necessarily have to be able to comprehend moral rules.		Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways to avoid ascribing immorality to people in comas: have no such moral rules for anyone...or just say, like any sane moral philosopher, that moral agents necessarily have to be able to comprehend moral rules.

	Obviously there's no need to avoid moral rules that might make moral nonagents immoral, since they can't be immoral.		Obviously there's no need to avoid moral rules that might make moral nonagents immoral...since they can't be immoral.

	Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll create from scratch a burning rhetorical building that you have to exit, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.		Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll create from scratch a burning rhetorical building that you have to exit, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

108.162.221.60: Much better

2012-10-12T20:12:50Z

Much better

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:12, 12 October 2012
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	<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>		<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>

	Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways ~~of avoiding~~ ascribing immorality to people in comas: have no such moral rules for anyone...or ~~put them outside the category of~~ moral agents ~~due~~ to ~~their inability~~ to comprehend moral rules.		Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways to avoid ascribing immorality to people in comas: have no such moral rules for anyone...or just say, like any sane moral philosopher, that moral agents necessarily have to be able to comprehend moral rules.

	~~Since putting men in comas as moral agents is what~~'s ~~actually "hard to imagine" here, don't do that. There's then~~ no need to avoid moral rules ~~for actual moral agents~~ that might make ~~coma patients~~ immoral.		Obviously there's no need to avoid moral rules that might make moral nonagents immoral, since they can't be immoral.

	Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll ~~think he's proven something. He'll show~~ that you have to exit ~~a burning rhetorical building~~, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.		Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll create from scratch a burning rhetorical building that you have to exit, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

	The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it.		The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it. The preferred one will eliminate the absurdity that led him to think that the burning rhetorical building existed at all.

	-- Mr. C		-- Mr. C

108.162.221.60: Clearer.

2012-10-12T20:04:45Z

Clearer.

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:04, 12 October 2012
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	<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>		<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>

	Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: ~~ensure~~ no moral rules ~~ascribe immorality to them~~...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.		Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: have no such moral rules for anyone...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.

	Since ~~avoiding the second way would also be~~ "hard to imagine", ~~you should automatically accept it~~. ~~Since the proposed problem will~~ no ~~longer exist, the first way is no longer necessary at all~~.		Since putting men in comas as moral agents is what's actually "hard to imagine" here, don't do that. There's then no need to avoid moral rules for actual moral agents that might make coma patients immoral.

	Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.		Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

FormerContributor-78162cb3: Nathan Larson moved page Talk:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4 to Book talk:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4

2012-10-12T19:59:01Z

Nathan Larson moved page Talk:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4 to Book talk:Universally Preferable Behaviour/4

← Older revision	Revision as of 19:59, 12 October 2012
(No difference)

108.162.221.60: Additional argument

2012-10-12T19:57:57Z

Additional argument

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:57, 12 October 2012
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	<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>		<blockquote>Intuitively, it is hard to imagine that any theory ascribing immorality to a man in a coma could be valid. Any ethical theory that posits a positive action as universally preferable behaviour faces the challenge of “the coma test.” If I say that giving to charity is a moral absolute, then clearly not giving to charity would be immoral. However, a man in a coma is clearly unable to give to charity, and thus would, by my theory, be classified as immoral. Similarly, a man who is asleep, or has no money to give – or the man currently receiving charity – would all be immoral.</blockquote>

	Yeah, that's intuitively hard to imagine, but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: ensure no moral rules ascribe immorality to them...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.		Yeah, that's intuitively "hard to imagine", but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: ensure no moral rules ascribe immorality to them...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.

			Since avoiding the second way would also be "hard to imagine", you should automatically accept it. Since the proposed problem will no longer exist, the first way is no longer necessary at all.

	Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.		Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

108.162.216.58: -comma

2012-10-12T19:37:07Z

-comma

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:37, 12 October 2012
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	Yeah, that's intuitively hard to imagine, but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: ensure no moral rules ascribe immorality to them...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.		Yeah, that's intuitively hard to imagine, but there are two ways of avoiding ascribing immorality to people in comas: ensure no moral rules ascribe immorality to them...or put them outside the category of moral agents due to their inability to comprehend moral rules.

	Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable, since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.		Stefan's lack of imagination in this kind of way is unfortunately quite common. He'll think he's proven something. He'll show that you have to exit a burning rhetorical building, he'll show you one way out of it, and it will seem quite reasonable since using that exit is preferable to the absurdity of remaining where you started.

	The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it.		The problem is that there are usually multiple exits out of it.

	-- Mr. C		-- Mr. C